Last night I was watching the Chaser’s Yes We Canberra (only a day late), and jumped out of my chair when I saw Craig Reucassel corner Tony Abbott to challenge him about his obsession with reducing Government debt. Have a look at this to see why!
Here is the post referred to in the video.
UPDATE: here’s a tweet from Craig on the topic of attribution (or lack thereof): http://twitter.com/craigreucassel/status/21647798173
With Australia’s Federal election looming, the opposition has today proudly announced a new policy to fund infrastructure without actually increasing Government debt! What are we to make of this?
It’s hard to determine the details from a media announcement, but based on the text posted by Peter Martin on his blog, it would seem that the idea is to provide tax incentives for entities other than the Federal Government to borrow to fund infrastructure:
Private infrastructure operators and State and Local Governments will be eligible to apply for the concessional treatment.
The way the scheme would seem to work is that eligible projects could issue bonds and investors would receive a tax rebate amounting to 10% of the interest on the bond. So, if you received a $100 interest payment and your earning put you in the top marginal tax bracket, you would pay $45 in tax. Under this scheme, you would only pay $35 in tax.
So, the cost to the Federal Government would simply be forgone tax revenue (and this would be capped at $150 million per annum) and the Opposition believes that the program could support up to $20 billion in infrastructure financing. Presumably, investors currently buying plasma TVs would rush to buy these bonds instead.
Seems like a neat trick, but I have a number of reservations about the scheme.
First, I have argued in the past that the near-hysterical concern about Government debt is overdone. For a start, Government debt in Australia is far lower than in other developed countries around the world. More importantly, the facile analogy that compares Government finance to that of a household budget does not stand up for one very important reason: unlike you or me, the Government is the monopoly issuer of Australian dollars. This changes the game and breaks the analogy utterly.
Second, the opposition’s policy would still involve raising significant amounts of debt, just not issued by the Federal Government. If that debt is all incurred instead by State Governments, should that really be a cause for celebration? After all, unlike the Commonwealth, State Governments do not control issuance of currency, so they really could go bankrupt and indeed, recent history has shown that many of the State Governments are loath to increase their debt levels too significantly for fear of having their credit rating downgraded. What if the borrowers are in the private sector? Well, that would be worse still! Back in March I updated my chart showing private and government sector debt. The debt level we should all be worried about in Australia is private sector debt, which is far higher than government sector debt.
Third, infrastructure bonds have form. Back in the 90s, the then Labor government introduced an infrastructure bond scheme which also featured tax incentives. Of course, it did not take long for clever investment bankers to work out how to surgically isolate the tax benefit so that wealthy individuals could take advantage of the concession without actually taking on any investment risk. In the end, the whole scheme was shut down, although some of the transactions that were done still survive today. I would expect exactly the same thing to happen with this policy. Any special tax treatment is always a red rag to the tax expert bull.
So, it may sound clever, but to me it does not seem to be sound policy.
Our regular guest contributor James Glover (aka @zebra) returns today with a look at the numbers behind the National Broadband Network. He asks: do you think it would be value for money?
The Labor Government’s proposed National Broadband Network (NBN) has many things to recommend it, not least speeds of up to 1GB/s (currently I am on 10Mb/s for ADSL; theoretical speeds of 24MB/s on ADSL2+ and 100MB/s on VDSL are also soon to be widely available, though the reality is dependent on many variables such as distance from an exchange). It would revolutionise the way we communicate as the higher bandwidth would allow not just interactive entertainment and fast downloads, but genuinely accessible cloud applications that really felt like they sat on your computer…and of course dishwashers waking up at 3.00am to negotiate the best electricity price. I doubt whether anybody on either side of politics would disagree that, in a perfect world, this is all desirable. But like all utopias, it comes at a cost and that is where the real divergence between the Labor Party and the Coalition’s broadband policies exists. I hope to cast some light on this cost argument using the power of the Time Value of Money, in particular calculating the real cost to you on a monthly basis so you can compare it with your existing broadband cost.
Labor wants an all-connecting fibre optic network (with subsidised satellite to cover really remote areas) that will cost an estimated $46bn. The Coalition wants a more modest effort: a fibre optic “backbone” network that uses existing copper wiring in urban areas and relies on market competition to pay for further improvements. It is estimated to cost about $8bn plus later commercial costs. Both of these figures seem extraordinarily high. How to decide if it is really worth it? Well if I told you that Labor’s NBN would cost you $10 per month would that sound too high? After all that only includes the infrastructure cost, not the access cost via an ISP. But most of us don’t pay upfront for our broadband or mobile (cell) phone bills, we pay monthly. The Coalition’s figure of $8bn works out at less than $2/month each (for those so inclined, you can read the details behind these figures). But it doesn’t include any additional costs charged by commercial companies building additional infrastructure. It also only claims to provide “peak speeds” of 10Mb/s which I already get on my ADSL+.
Is $10/month a lot of money? Or $2/month for that matter? It obviously depends on what your income is and how much you are currently prepared to pay for broadband. My broadband plan costs $50 for 120GB/month. I also live in a one-person household. It doesn’t sound much to me, but all those $10/month costs add up to the thousands we pay in tax each year. There’s no point paying more for little for no benefit. Of course it’s not going to be charged directly, but through increased taxes (or decreased services). I estimate $10/month to represent an average increase in the tax rate of about 0.5%. This seems reasonable to me. After all, if in 2020 a businessperson (or BusinessBot2020) came to Australia and found our broadband to be the equivalent of dial-up today, they’d hardly be impressed enough to invest in a technology business. Of course, by 2020 with super-fast broadband we should really be able to do most business remotely, right? But we’ve been saying that since the invention of the telephone.
So I’m for the Government’s NBN plan…but what do you think?
Update: I have since writing this post changed my mind based on readers’ comments and some research. It appears that many of the benefits of the NBN are available already on ADSL2+, VDSL and 4G and the Coalition’s more modest plan to build a fibre-optic network backbone might be sufficient. There is also the question of whether a Government entity is best placed to oversee such a large scale project – it’s not like Peter Garrett is going to personally project manage the NBN but Governments in general are not (IMO) best placed to predict and respond to consumer demand. But I accept there are strong feelings on both sides. Sometimes that bright shiny thing in your vision is a light on a hill and sometimes it’s a white elephant blocking your view.
UPDATE: Let us know what you think by voting in this broadband poll.
In the third in a series of guest posts on the subject of Australian mining tax, Zebra (James Glover) considers the changes to the proposed tax the new prime minister, Julia Gillard, has negotiated with miners.
The Govt has announced a replacement for the RSPT discussed in earlier posts to a Mineral Resources Rent Tax (MRRT). The principle differences are the tax rate – 30% and a change in the deduction. For established mines it is now based on market value depreciated over 25 years and the uplift rate is 12% not 5%. In addition there is a 25% deduction from earnings upfront which makes the base rate of tax 22.5% rather than 40%.
This post replaces an earlier one I put up about the MRRT in which I erroneously assumed that the opt-in about using the market value of assets applied in the way I proposed in my second post. The key statement here is:
“Miners may elect to use the book or market value as the starting base for project assets, with depreciation accelerated over 5 years when book value, excluding mining rights, is used; or effective life (up to 25 years) when market value at 1 May 2010, including mining rights, is used. All post 1 May 2010 capital expenditure will be added to the starting base.”
In the case where the mining company opts to use a market value approach I take it to mean the depreciation takes place before the MRRT is calculated. This means the formula is:
MRRT = 30% x (75% x Earnings – Price(2010)/25)
Currently the mining industry average for P/E (price to earnings ratio) is 14, though in the case of BHP-Billiton it is 19. For an average miner then Price(2010)/25 = Earnings x 14/25 = 56% Earnings so the actual MRRT is based on 19% of Earnings. However the Price is fixed at the May 1 2010 value so this will not increase over time even though earnings will. Should earnings continue to rise at the dramatic rate we have seen in the past decade then the MRRT will eventually look more like the 22.5% base rate.
It appears that the Govt and the mining industry’s compromise is to push the revenue from the tax windfall out from today to later years. In a sense the mining industry has also removed the contentious “retrospectivity” of the tax by using the current high price and choice of 25 years depreciation to ensure the current value of the MRRT is minimised but will rise at 22.5% of increased earnings going forward.
Thanks to an observant reader who pointed out my error. Mea culpa.
Following on from the interest generated by his last post, Mule Stable regular Zebra (James Glover) returns to the subject of the Resources Super Profits Tax in another guest post.
In a previous post I explained how the formula for the RSPT (Resource Super Profits Tax) was derived by considering the Government to be a 40% silent investor in any mining project. I showed that the correct deduction from the return on investments is indeed GBR (Government Bond Rate), as proposed, not a higher rate that includes a “price of risk”. One important thing I missed in this analysis, however, was whether the investment amount (I) was the correct basis for valuing the Government’s new 40% “investment”. I aim to show that the correct variable should actually be the Market Value of Assets (MVA) and as such the appropriate deduction from profits is several times (maybe as much as 4 times) higher for established mines.In the example given based on the mining industry “price to earnings ratio” of 14 the RSPT would only be 9% of earnings. I should emphasise this is not about having separate formulas for new and existing mines but correctly taking into account the fair, market based, price the Govt should pay for it’s 40% share of the earnings.
For new mines MVA = I (where all “=” signs should be taken to mean “approximately equal” to head off the pedants) so the proposed tax is correct in this case.
The Government says that in return for this tax take they are taking downside risk as well as upside benefit. One of the criticisms of the RSPT is that the Government is effectively nationalising 40% of ongoing mines and the GBR deduction is irrelevant as there is no serious downside risk. In the framework I propose the Government is not currently proposing to pay a fair price for this “nationalisation”. If the fair price of the Government’s stake is taken into account then the tax from existing mines is considerably lower than proposed. It may be as low as 9% of earnings. This does not require a backdown by either the miners or the Government, although the Government’s tax take might be less than forecast
If the Government is going to nationalise 40% of a mine – at a fair price – then it needs to effectively pay 40% of the Market Value of Assets (or MVA) for the mine. For new mines the Investment = Equity + Debt is pretty much set at this value. The Government RSPT tax is then:
Tax = 40% x (Earnings – GBR x MVA)
The first term is the Government’s 40% share of the earnings (here taken as Earnings before Tax). The second term is the deduction for the interest that recognizes that the funding of the Government’s share is undertaken by the mine at the Government Bond Rate or GBR. There is no good reason for the Government to pay less than the market value of this asset or MVA. For a new mine just starting up MVA = I, the investment amount, so
Tax = 40% x (Earnings – GBR x I)
If ROI = Return on Investment = Earnings/I then we can write this as:
Tax = 40% x (ROI – GBR) x I
which is the proposed RSPT formula.
For an ongoing mining operation with established operations and contracts, the market value will exceed the book value several times over. I am going to take the very simple assumption that MVA = Price ie the market value of the assets is the market value of the equity. This ignores leverage and is probably too simplistic. Price is based on share price and the number of outstanding shares. In terms of PE-ratio (the ratio of Price to Earnings as determined by the share price) we can write
Tax = 40% x Earnings x (1 – GBR x PE-ratio)
Compared to the original formula the deduction is 40% x GBR x PE-ratio x Earnings. Alternatively we can write this as 40% x GBR x I x MBR where MBR is the Market to Book ratio = MVA/I. So the original Govt funding deduction is just multiplied by MBR. The current formula assumes implicitly that MBR = 1. For existing businesses eg. banks MVA/BVA can be as high as 4 (which is BHPs current value). This gives a very simple deduction in terms of % of earnings, rather than Investment/I, of 40% x GBR x PE-ratio. Note that this is really the same formula for new and existing mines; it just makes proper allowance for the true value of established mines.
So what is the fair deduction for existing mines? It obviously varies with share price and hence market conditions. For mines which are privately held we need a proxy based on publicly traded stocks. The PE-ratio for traded mining stocks is currently about 14. So now, using GBR=5.5%, the fair deduction for the Govt’s nationalised share for existing mines is not 5.5% (as many erroneously claim) or 22% (allowing for a 25% ROI) but 31%! Note this deduction is off the 40% so the total RSPT tax on earnings would be 9%.
So under a scheme based on a fair deduction for existing mining assets the tax should be:
RSPT = 40% x Earnings x (1 – 5.5% x 14) = 9% x Earnings.
After 30% company tax this represent a total tax of 38%. Even if we don’t know what the PE-ratio would be for mines which aren’t publicly traded we can use an industry based proxy for the mines whose stocks are publicly traded. Currently this is in the range 13-14. If I was the miners I’d be pretty happy with that. Maybe they should have taken a closer look at the RSPT before opposing it. All the miners have to do is get the Govt to accept it should pay a fair value for its stake and the framework I propose makes that transparent.
Over recent months there have been a few informal polls on the Mule Stable on whether or not the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) would be moving interest rates. There will be another monthly policy decision tomorrow and this time I decided to make poll a bit more structured, courtesy of the PollDaddy website. If you come across this post before early Tuesday afternoon, you will still have a chance to chip in with your prediction.
Polls like this will start to be a regular feature on the Mule Stable and I will publish some of them here on the blog too. This one is a gentle start: there is a strong consensus as to what will happen tomorrow (the blog title is a giveaway!). Next time, I will aim for a more controversial question!
UPDATE: In the end, 83% of poll respondents picked no change, which is indeed what happened.
My last post, Are Australia’s banks about to collapse?, took Steve Keen to task for a presentation on the dire outlook for Australia’s property market and its banks. However, a commenter has pointed out that it was not Steve’s presentation! Moreover, the final slide of the presentation, which is in very poor taste, appears to have been added by Business Insider.
How did I get that wrong? By following one link too few. Here is a quote from the Business Insider article where I found the presentation:
according to this presentation from economist Steve Keen, courtesy of Mish’s Global Economic Analysis
Following the link to Mish’s Global Economic Analysis gets a bit closer to the truth (“on his blog” not “by him”):
Australian economist Steve Keen addresses that question and more in a presentation on his blog How to Profit From the Coming Aussie Property Crash (and Banking Crisis)
At that point I made the mistake of not following the final link to Steve’s blog and instead read the presentation. Slide 3 was a familiar one I had seen in various forms and by then the notion that Steve had written the presentation was firmly implanted. The style should have given me pause for thought as it is extraordinarily hyperbolic.
If I had followed the final link, as indeed I should have done, I would have found a post entitled “Excellent presentation on Scribd on Australian housing” the following on Steve’s blog:
This presentation was noted by a blog member today. Take particular note of slides 21-20 which compare the balance sheets of US and UK banks to that of one Australian bank, the Commonwealth.
How to Profit From the Coming Aussie Property Crash (and Banking Crisis)
So who did write the presentation? Who knows, but it was uploaded to Scribd by someone called Karenina Fay.
In any event, while Steve may think it is an excellent presentation and I clearly do not, he did not write it and hence this a mea culpa. I apologise for following others in incorrectly attributing this presentation to Steve and I have edited the original post. I will also be endeavouring to click that last link in future!
UPDATE: In this post I repeated Business Insider’s mistake of attributing the presentation I criticise to Steve Keen. While Steve considers it an excellent presentation, he did not write it and I apologise for not confirming the source before publishing this post. I have now struck out the incorrect attributions. My criticisms of the presentation itself still hold, which is why I am leaving the post up in its edited form.
Steve Keen and his forecasts of a property market collapse have received plenty of local media coverage over the years. Now he has come to the attention of the international press as well.
In April, Keen hiked to the top of Mount Kosciuszko after losing a bet about the direction of property prices with Macquarie Bank strategist Rory Robertson. This event was enough to prompt an extensive review of Keen’s concerns in the New York Times. Curiously, Robertson himself did not receive a mention, despite winning the bet.
Now the US business site Business Insider, which has a penchant for drama, has published one of Keen’s presentations a presentation, incorrectly attributed to Keen, under the headline “Here’s What You Need To Know About The Major Property, Debt, And Banking Crisis Brewing In Australia”.
One of Keen’s central concerns is the size of private sector debt in Australia. This is a legitimate concern and should receive more focus than misguided fears about Australian government debt. However, I am far less pessimistic than Keen about the outlook for Australian property prices.
As for the Business Insider presentation, Keen takes his concerns it goes too far, to the point of unsupportable alarmism. The final slide of the presentation is evidence enough of this, not to mention being in extremely poor taste. This slide appears to have been added by Business Insider! If that is not enough to convince you, I will consider just one of the arguments offered by the anonymous author Keen.
On slide 22 of the presentation, he writes:1
Look at CBA 2009 annual report—Leverage ratio is almost 20 times (total assets of $620.4 billion against $31.4 billion of equity). Of $620.4 billion of assets, $473.7 billion are loan assets. If around 6.6% of CBA’s loans go bad (any loans not just mortgages), 100% of its shareholder equity will be wiped out!!
(the bold italics are not mine, they appear in the presentation). Here the implication is something like “6.6% is not very much. Wow! CBA could easily collapse!”. But, that line of thinking does not stand up to even moderate reflection.
Crucially, we must understand what “going bad” means for a loan. It does not mean losing everything, which is in fact very rare for most types of bank loans.
Over half of CBA’s are home loans and these are secured by the property that has been mortgaged. According to their half-year presentation2, based on current market valuations, the average loan-to-value ratio (LVR) for CBA’s portfolio is 42%. This means that, on average, the value of the property is more than twice the loan amount. This gives the bank an enormous buffer against falls in property prices. Of course, this average conceals a mix of high and very-low LVR loans. Even assuming that loan defaults occurred on a higher LVR section of the portfolio, say with an average LVR of 70%, and allowing for Keen’s oft-quoted figure of a 40% decline in house prices, CBA would still only lose 14% on their defaulting loans3. Even then, this does not take into account the fact that, like other lenders, CBA takes out mortgage insurance on loans with an LVR of more than 80%.
But we can be more conservative still. In their prudential standards, the banking regulator APRA considers a severely stressed loss rate on defaulting home loans to be 20%. To suffer actual losses of 6.6% in their mortgage portfolio, CBA would have to suffer a default rate of at least 33%! This would be astonishingly unprecedented. Currently, the number of CBA borrowers late on their mortgage payments by 90 days or more is running at around 1%. Most of these borrowers will end up getting their finances back in order, so for actual defaults to reach 33% is inconceivable. A default rate of a “mere” 2% would be extraordinary enough for CBA.
As for the rest of the $473.7 billion, it includes personal loans, credit card loans, business loans and corporate loans. The loss rates on some of these loans can be higher than for mortgage portfolios, but losing everything on every defaulting loan is still highly unlikely. So to suffer 6.6% in actual losses on these loans, defaults would have to run at a far higher rate. Furthermore, since the dire prognosis for the banks is rooted in the view that the property “bubble” is about to burst, presumably the argument would not simply be based on everything other than the home loan portfolio collapsing.
If property prices do fall sharply and our economy has another downturn, will bank earnings be affected? Of course. Are they teetering on the brink of collapse? Of course not.
1 While there is a footnote on the slide referencing this post, what is not made clear is that the whole paragraph is a direct quote rather than Keen’s own words. Presumably he agrees with it though!
2 Page 84.
3 If property prices fall to 60% of the original value, the loss on a 70% LVR loan would be (70% – 60%)/70% = 14.3%.
This guest post from Mule Stable regular Zebra (James Glover) delves into the details of the proposed Resources Super Profits Tax.
The Australian Government (hereby known as the Govt) has proposed a Resources Super Profits Tax (RSPT) for mining companies. Superficially it appears to be a 40% tax on all profits (measured by Return On Investment or ROI) in excess of the Govt Bond Rate (or GBR, the interest rate at which the Govt borrows money, over the long-term).
The key points of this article are:
1. The GBR is the correct threshold level for RSPT,
2. If the Govt increases the threshold above GBR this will represent a subsidy of miners by taxpayers,
3. The RSPT will benefit small and marginal mining projects to get finance through partial Govt backing of risks.
So for example suppose miner Mineral Wealth of Australia (MWA) invests $1bn in the Mt Koalaroo Iron-Ore mine. MWA is a wholly owned subsidiary of Silver Back Mining (SBM). In the year following they make $200m profit or a return on investment (ROI) of 20%. If the GBR = 5.5% then the 40% RSPT means a tax revenue to the Govt of Tax = 40% x (20%-5.5%) x $1000m = $58m.
This seems very straight forward. It appears that the Govt is saying that GBR represents some “fair” level of return and anything in excess of this is a “super profit” to be taxed accordingly. Not at the normal company tax rate of 30% but a “super tax” rate of 40%. This is how it has been presented by both sides in the media. Arguments against the RSPT have focused on whether the GBR as a “risk-free” rate is the appropriate benchmark for a risky profit stream. Indeed it is not but in fact this isn’t what the RSPT is about. For example normally taxes on profits have no negative impact on the Govt if the company loses money. In the case of the RSPT though the Govt has stated that 40% of any losses can either be claimed back from the Govt (as a refund) or carried over to other projects.
So what is the RSPT? A good way to consider it is if the Govt took a 40% stake in MWA as a “silent partner”, leaving SBM with a 60% stake. In this case we would expect the Govt to contribute $400m of the investment costs (raised presumably through issuing bonds at the GBR or equivalent). In return it would get 40% of the profit. The Govt return would therefore be 40% of the profit less the cost of funding its 40% investment ie Tax = ROI x 40% x I – GBR x 40% x I = 40% x (ROI – GBR) x I.
This appears to be the formula that the Govt has presented to calculate the RSPT and in this derivation it is quite straightforward. However the Govt appears to be getting something for nothing since it isn’t actually stumping up the $400m in investment capital. So what’s going on? A clever piece of financial engineering that’s what. The Govt avoids raising the capital itself (and hence have it be counted as Govt debt) by getting the project to raise it on the Govt’s behalf.
(You can easily skip the next paragraph if you aren’t interested in the details of mine financing costs)
Whilst MWA raises 100% of the $1bn in capital the Govt appears to get the upside (and potential downside) as if it has contributed $400m without doing so. Money for old rope you say. However consider MWA not to be the stand-alone mining company SBM, but the joint venture beween the Govt and SBM. Suppose MWA borrows $1bn in capital at its Project Funding Cost (or PFC). This PFC will be lower than the SBM’s Miner’s Funding Cost (or MFC) as the Govt is now backing 40% of all liabilities. In fact in an efficient market we deduce PFC = 60% x MFC + 40% x GBR. If MWA then allocated these funding costs accordingly it would charge the Govt its share, risk-weighted, not PFC, but GBR. If the GBR = 5% and MFC = 8% then we expect PFC = 6.8% not the 8% if SBM was the sole investor. Under this arrangment SBM’s cost of funding (in % terms) its effective 60% share of the joint project is the same as its stand alone cost of funds, as it should be.
An argument against raising the threshold above GBR is that this will effectively lower the miners’ cost of funds, the difference being borne by the Govt and hence us taxpayers. No wonder miners are arguing so vehemently for the threshold to be raised. In fact it can be shown that raising the threshold to 11%, as some propose, and using a GBR of 5.5% would effectively reduce the miners’ cost of funds by a whopping 3.67%! If you want a formula for the Miners’ Taxpayer Subsidy(MTS) it is: MTS = 2/3 x (Threshold – GBR) in terms of the miners’ funding cost discount (paid for by the taxpayers remember); or MTS = 40% x I x (Threshold – GBR) in $ terms. For the Koalaroo mine this would represent $22m of funding cost transferred from the mining company SBM to the taxpayer. That’s you and me. You don’t see that in their ads.
From the Govts perspective the advantage to them is that the investment does not sit on their balance sheet but the project company MWA’s and in effect SBM’s balance sheet. From a financial engineering point of view all this makes perfect sense. Having said that, it was precisely this sort of clever off-balance sheet flim-flammary that got Greece (and Lehman’s et al) in trouble. We need to make absolutely sure it is properly accounted for.
Update: Several commenters have pointed out the effect on mine financing of the RSPT. Specifically with the Govt backing 40% of any losses smaller stand-alone projects will find it easier to get project finance. As discussed above the funding cost will be lower with the Govt’s partial backing. The operating profit (so called EBITDA) of the project is unchanged so this makes them more, not less, viable. This is at odds with what the miners have been saying. Even existing projects with refinancing clauses in their loans should find it easy to convince their lenders to reduce their interest payments. For large global miners such as BHP-Billiton, who issue bonds, it will be harder to disentangle the Australian RSPT benefit to their overall cost of funds and hence spreads. But the market should over time price this in with lower spreads on their bonds. With a reduced cost of funds miners will be able to leverage their existing equity across more projects and make up for the 40% the Govt now takes out of individual profits (and losses) through the RSPT.
Update: Tom Albanese, CEO of Rio Tinto was on Inside Business on ABC on Sunday May 30. It is interesting that in arguing against the RSPT he referred to the unfairness of the Govt coming in as a 40% “silent partner”, and not about the GBR threshold. He clearly understands the true nature of the RSPT. While it was self-serving he emphasised (in my terminology) the determination of Investment or “I” for existing projects. Depreciation comes into it but some of these projects are decades old and it would an accountant’s dream/nightmare to work out the correct value of I to base the Govt’s GBR deduction on. He also questioned the “principle” (his word) of the Govt forcibly coming in as a “silent partner” on projects which are clearly profitable going forward, having survived to this point. After all they are not compensating mining companies for mining projects that failed in the past. I’m afraid I have to agree with this point, though I think it is more complex than I currently comprehend. It is good to see the RSPT being debated for once without the disinformation we have seen from less eloquent opponents. After all the Govt did say at the beginning that it was these sort of aspects of the RSPT they were prepared to negotiate on, not the 40% and not the GBR threshold.
UPDATE: Zebra looks at a fair value approach to the RSPT.
The recent announcement by the Australian Treasurer of plans to introduce a “Resource Super Profits Tax” (RSPT) has led to the longest discussion thread on the Mule Stable yet. A lot of the discussion turned on whether or not share investors can be considered to have lost anything when share prices fall if they have not sold their shares.
Whether or not “unrealised losses” should be considered real losses takes us back to an oft-visited topic: the nature of money. Money has many guises: store of wealth, medium of exchange and, most relevant here, unit of value. Finance has its jargon like any other discipline and when money serves as a unit of value, it is known as a numéraire. Today, however, I will not explore the theory of money any further (although, you can trawl through the Mule Stable discussion to gather some of my thoughts). Instead, I will focus on what has happened to mining stocks.
The chart below shows the performance of the S&P/ASX 300 share price and the Metals and Mining index. While not quite as broad as the All Ordinaries index, the Australian stock market is dominated by large companies and in fact the market capitalization* of the ASX 300 is around 85% of the All Ordinaries, so it does give a very good indication of the performance of the overall market. The Metals and Mining index simply consists of those companies in the ASX 300 that are categorised as being (no surprise) in the business of metals or mining. In order to provide a direct comparison, both of these indices have been scaled to a common base of 100 on 30 April. This was this the Friday before the weekend announcement of the RSPT.
Performance of the Mining Sector following the RSPT announcement*
As the chart clearly shows, the metals and mining index certainly did suffer more than the market as a whole in the first couple of days after the announcement. By the end of Tuesday, resources had fallen 4% more than the ASX 300. Since the RSPT can only serve to decrease not increase profits of resources companies, this fall would seem quite reasonable. Curiously though, this week resources closed the gap once more. In fact, the resources sector has now performed 0.35% better than the overall market!
Of course, one could argue that the sector returns would have been even better over the last two weeks if the tax had never been announced. That may well be the case, but it is hard to argue that the Government had caused a terrible mischief to the superannuation savings of all working Australians when resource have, well, matched the performance of the broader market.
*Data source: Standard and Poor’s
